General Pervez Musharraf spoke to the nation on Thursday and, as expected in the wake of the London bombings and the Pakistani origins of at least three suspects, focused on the need to root out extremism. Once again, he issued a litany of administrative directives to deal with extremist organisations and the terrorism threat. The police crackdown had begun days before General Musharraf spoke and his speech was meant both as a signal that he is serious about dealing with the threat and winning people to the course of action he is now embarked upon.

Some of the measures are usual: organisations banned on account of terrorism/extremism/sectarianism will not be allowed to operate under any name (this has been said before and we don’t know how this will be enforced); possession and display of arms will be strictly prohibited (we don’t know whether this is proposed across the board or relates to extremists only. The de-weaponisation drive has failed and since last year arms licences are being issued); madrassahs will be registered by December this year (we have heard this too before; the seminaries have refused to oblige. The federal religion minister himself remains opposed to coercion). Strict action will be taken against those printing, publishing and distributing hate material (jihadi publications have been operating freely until now; even mainstream vernacular press publishes material that can be deemed inciting; we do not know how this measure will be enforced since it has great potential of abuse even as it can be justified in certain cases); jihadi organisations will not be allowed to collect donations (nothing new here; the problem of enforcement will again present itself especially in cases where some of these organisations use this money for social services and win adherents through humanitarian work rather than overt indoctrination).

Leaving aside the problem of enforcement, let’s consider two other broad issues that have made it difficult for General Musharraf to tackle the problem of religious groups and parties. On the domestic front, the General and the army as a whole, remain afraid of a genuine political process. For this reason, it has traditionally done two things: allow the religious parties political space and prevent viable political entities from playing their role by splintering them or attempting to create a third political force. General Musharraf has been no exception. Religious groups, while opposing the military’s presence on the surface, have continued to enjoy its patronage by supporting its security policies and providing manpower for them. The only difference this time has been the tension generated by external pressure that wants Pakistan to clean up its act. Also, some of the radical groups affiliated with Al Qaeda do not subscribe to the army’s new strategy of putting down that threat and forcing the jihadis to focus within the region rather than beyond.

The second aspect is the transition in the army’s India policy from the use of these groups against that country to a process of normalisation. But normalisation has not, so far, thrown up any substantive advantages. From the army’s perspective, it makes sense not to entirely scuttle the option of their use sometime in the future.

On both counts the army is wrong. What General Musharraf wants to do for Pakistan cannot be done if he does not link up with genuine political elements. This means that he must understand that at some point the army has to get out of the system and go back to doing what it is charged to do. Two, the policy of using the jihadis did not succeed before and, in the changed circumstances, has a snowball’s chance in hell of succeeding. This option must therefore be picked off the table completely.

Administrative measures alone will not work unless the fundamentals are changed. General Musharraf cannot thrive in chaos and if he is serious about tackling the issue, he needs to take a broader and more wholesome view of the situation.

Interestingly, his reading of the terrorism link with Britain is spot-on. He is right in saying that a couple of visits to Pakistan could not have motivated the bombers to do what they did. In any case, the Jamaican did not even visit Pakistan. He is correct in pointing out that Britain has an extremist problem with an entirely internal spin and London needs to address that. He referred to groups that openly operate in Britain and spread hate.

What is required of him is an equally sound appreciation of the nature of the problem within Pakistan. He might realise that his own constituency has much to do with the conception and rearing of this problem. Also, that the problem is persisting, among other reasons, because of his own decision to prevent political parties from playing their role. *